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Secure capture
Hardware or controlled capture paths can strengthen evidence about where media began. See Sony's Camera Authenticity Solution.
A proposed end-to-end Evidence Trail for selected creation, editing, review and custody checkpoints.
No live Evidence Records are issued, and no verification, certification or legal chain-of-custody service is offered here.
Finished files and physical objects often hide how source material, editing, review and custody were handled.
Isolated metadata, signatures and receipts can be useful, but ordinary readers may struggle to interpret them together or understand what each one leaves open.
HumanVerified proposes to record selected, policy-defined checkpoints in a readable sequence while showing the limits and gaps attached to each claim.
HumanVerified is developing a first-mover, cross-domain, reader-facing Evidence Trail. Here, end-to-end means spanning selected checkpoints from source or capture to current status; it never means continuous or complete observation.
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Hardware or controlled capture paths can strengthen evidence about where media began. See Sony's Camera Authenticity Solution.
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C2PA Content Credentials can bind signed assertions, ingredients and editing actions to supported assets.
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Version control and signed attestations can relate source, builds and releases, but do not prove authorship or intent.
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HumanVerified proposes to connect selected machine evidence, scoped human decisions, handovers and current status in one purpose-bound reader journey.
Starling Lab's capture-to-publication work demonstrates important adjacent practice. HumanVerified's proposal is positioned alongside, not as a replacement for or endorsement by, these systems.
Only selected policy-defined checkpoints are recorded; gaps stay visible.
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Where source material first entered the declared process, with fresh challenges or signed capture evidence where appropriate.
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Named artifact versions, ingredients, declared actions and controlled-tool records.
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A person's decision, the material considered and the exact review scope.
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Transfer of control or possession, with physical and digital evidence labelled separately.
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The latest accepted, superseded, withdrawn or unresolved state at the time of checking.
Fictional example A handmade silver pendant moves through five declared checkpoints.
sha256: 8f2c…a1e9sha256: 41bd…90c2sha256: b730…6d4asha256: 0ca7…e133sha256: d219…7bc001
Follow a brief, sources, drafts, review, build and release through selected checkpoints.
Research question Does the trail keep human decisions separate from Git, in-toto/SLSA-style and document evidence?
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Connect a brief, primary and witness capture, fresh session challenges, editing, review and export.
Research question Do attempted replay, virtual-input and omitted-edit attacks leave understandable evidence gaps?
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Relate materials, making, review, a tag and handover without collapsing distinct physical claims.
Research question Can readers distinguish making evidence, tag possession and continuous physical attachment?
The proposal is a conditional six-week lab programme, subject to funding, staffing, privacy, security and accessibility design, with go/no-go gates before wider work.
Week 1
Scope, governance, threat model and fictional fixtures.
Weeks 2–3
Canonical events, receipts, credentials, transparency checks and a readable status view.
Week 4
Media, software, document and craft adapters with adversarial fixtures.
Week 5
Controlled demonstrations, accessibility and reader-comprehension testing.
Week 6
Recovery exercise, evidence-gap report and go/no-go recommendation.
v0.1 · 3 September 2026 · Proposed proof of concept
AI-generated under human direction. No named independent human review or approval is currently recorded.
The documents and checksums identify the current proposal and allow exact release files to be compared; they do not show that the proposed system has been implemented, undergone an independent audit or validated in operation. Checksums do not stop a file being changed or prove authorship.
Fund the controlled programme.
Strengthen secure capture, credentials, provenance and transparency engineering.
Test real editorial, research, software and craft workflows.
Challenge privacy, security, accessibility, identity and evaluation assumptions.
No live Evidence Records are issued, and no verification, certification or legal chain-of-custody service is offered here.